If you have been instructed as an expert witness on a medical negligence matter, this guide will help you understand the basic law surrounding clinical negligence. It is designed to provide a reference for you to refer to; however, it should not be taken as legal advice. If you have any questions regarding the law, speaking to your instructing Solicitor or Barrister is always best.
Contents
The key medical negligence cases
Definition of Negligence
Negligence falls under the law of tort. Tort is a wrongful act or an infringement of a right (other than under contract) leading to legal liability under common law.
The Legal Test for Negligence
The legal test for negligence is as follows:
- The Defendant must owe a duty of care to the Claimant.
- The Defendant must have breached that duty.
- The breach must have caused foreseeable harm or damage to the Claimant.
The landmark case establishing the modern negligence law is Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. In this case, Mrs. Donoghue consumed a ginger beer that contained a decomposed snail, leading to illness. She could not bring a claim under contract law because she had not purchased the drink herself. Instead, she brought a claim in tort against the manufacturer/
Lord Atkin delivered the following words that every law student will be familiar with:
“At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of “culpa”, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot, in a practical world, be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”
Nineteen years later, the case of Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 further developed the law of negligence. Miss Stone was injured by a cricket ball hit out of the ground. The House of Lords held that the cricket club was not negligent because the likelihood of such an accident was minimal, and reasonable precautions had been taken. Bolton set out that a breach of duty occurs only if the Defendant’s actions fall below the standard of care expected in the circumstances. The standard is that of the ‘reasonable person’, considering factors such as the likelihood of harm, the severity of potential harm, and the burden of taking precautions.
In Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, the House of Lords provided a three-part test the Courts must use to see if a duty of care arises:
- The harm must be a foreseeable result of the Defendant’s actions.
- There must be a sufficiently proximate relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.
- Imposing a duty of care must be fair, just, and reasonable in the circumstances.
Medical negligence defined
Medical negligence, also known as clinical negligence, occurs when a healthcare professional provides treatment that falls below the accepted standard of care, resulting in harm or injury to the patient. This breach of duty must be directly connected to the injury or harm suffered by the patient (causation).
In medical negligence cases, the Claimant must prove their case on the balance of probabilities, the civil standard of proof. This means that it must be more likely than not (i.e., greater than 50% probability) that the healthcare provider’s negligence caused the harm.
The key medical negligence cases
Three key cases establish the tests for medical negligence: Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, and Hunter v Hanley. These cases and the tests they provide are set out in detail below.
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee established what is known as the Bolam test, a fundamental principle in assessing the standard of care in professional negligence cases, including medical negligence. It provides that a healthcare professional is not negligent if they acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical professionals skilled in that particular profession, even if there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary view.
Evidence of an accepted practice must be responsible and reasonable. In other words, provided the doctor explained the risks of a given treatment to the extent that it accorded with a responsible body of medical opinion, they would not be liable for negligence.
The Bolam test applies to all professional liability cases.
The House of Lords confirmed the Bolam principle in Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871. Lord Diplock then discussed whether a doctor had a duty to inform a patient of a procedure or treatment’s possible complications.
“The only effect that mention of risks can have on the patient’s mind, if it has any at all, can be in the direction of deterring the patient from undergoing the treatment which in the expert opinion of the doctor it is in the patient’s interest to undergo. To decide what risks the existence of which a patient should be voluntarily warned and the terms in which such warning, if any, should be given, having regard to the effect that the warning may have, is as much an exercise of professional skill and judgment as any other part of the doctor’s comprehensive duty of care to the individual patient, and expert medical evidence on this matter should be treated in just the same way. The Bolam test should be applied.”
Lord Templeman went further in affirming that in some circumstances, a doctor would be justified in not outlining risks to patients:
“I do not subscribe to the theory that the patient is entitled to know everything nor to the theory that the doctor is entitled to decide everything…The doctor, obedient to the high standards set by the medical profession impliedly contracts to act at all times in the best interests of the patient. No doctor in his senses would impliedly contract at the same time to give to the patient all the information available to the doctor as a result of the doctor’s training and experience and as a result of the doctor’s diagnosis of the patient. An obligation to give a patient all the information available to the doctor would often be inconsistent with the doctor’s contractual obligation to have regard to the patient’s best interests. Some information might confuse, other information might alarm a particular patient. Whenever the occasion arises for the doctor to tell the patient the results of the doctor’s diagnosis, the possible methods of treatment and the advantages and disadvantages of the recommended treatment, the doctor must decide in the light of his training and experience and in the light of his knowledge of the patient what should be said and how it should be said.”
Twenty years later, the Supreme Court in the Scottish case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, essentially rejected the decision in Sidaway, stating it did not match modern practices. The Lords concluded that there is a requirement of ‘informed choice’ or ‘informed consent’ by patients in medical treatment that rests fundamentally on the duty of disclosure by medical practitioners.
It is worth quoting the crux of the decision, made by Lord Kerr and Reed, in full:
- Furthermore, because the extent to which a doctor may be inclined to discuss risks with a patient is not determined by medical learning or experience, the application of the Bolamtest to this question is liable to result in the sanctioning of differences in practice which are attributable not to divergent schools of thought in medical science, but merely to divergent attitudes among doctors as to the degree of respect owed to their patients.
- A person can of course decide that she does not wish to be informed of risks of injury (just as a person may choose to ignore the information leaflet enclosed with her medicine); and a doctor is not obliged to discuss the risks inherent in treatment with a person who makes it clear that she would prefer not to discuss the matter. Deciding whether a person is so disinclined may involve the doctor making a judgment; but it is not a judgment which is dependent on medical expertise. It is also true that the doctor must necessarily make a judgment as to how best to explain the risks to the patient, and that providing an effective explanation may require skill. But the skill and judgment required are not of the kind with which the Bolamtest is concerned; and the need for that kind of skill and judgment does not entail that the question whether to explain the risks at all is normally a matter for the judgment of the doctor. That is not to say that the doctor is required to make disclosures to her patient if, in the reasonable exercise of medical judgment, she considers that it would be detrimental to the health of her patient to do so; but the “therapeutic exception”, as it has been called, cannot provide the basis of the general rule.
- It follows that the analysis of the law by the majority in Sidawayis unsatisfactory, in so far as it treated the doctor’s duty to advise her patient of the risks of proposed treatment as falling within the scope of the Bolamtest, subject to two qualifications of that general principle, neither of which is fundamentally consistent with that test. It is unsurprising that courts have found difficulty in the subsequent application of Sidaway, and that the courts in England and Wales have in reality departed from it; a position which was effectively endorsed, particularly by Lord Steyn, in Chester v Afshar. There is no reason to perpetuate the application of the Bolam test in this context any longer.
- The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, can now be seen to be substantially that adopted in Sidaway by Lord Scarman, and by Lord Woolf MR in Pearce, subject to the refinement made by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker, which we have discussed at paras 77-73. An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.
The decision in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v Heller & Partners Ltd. [1964] AC 465 created the rule of “reasonable reliance”:
“Where a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, and a person takes it upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”
Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority
In Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771, a child, P, was admitted to hospital due to difficulty breathing. P’s doctor was notified to attend P after he suffered two ‘noisy’ breathing episodes. The doctor did not attend P, who suffered a cardiac arrest and died.
Applying the Bolam test, the trial judge had found that P’s doctor had breached her duty of care by failing to attend P, but that the breach had not caused P’s death since, had the doctor attended, she would not have performed the intubation needed to save P’s life and, based on the expert medical evidence presented, she would not have been negligent in failing to do so.
P’s mother appealed on the grounds that the Bolam test did not apply to causation in cases where the Defendant omitted to act.
The House of Lords stated “a defendant cannot escape liability by saying that the damage would have occurred in any event because he would have committed some other breach of duty thereafter”. Therefore, the Court had to decide on the hypothetical question, “Was the decision not to intubate P a breach of duty”?
Eight medical expert witnesses provided evidence to the House of Lords. Five said they would have intubated P, three said they would not, but all agreed that intubation was not a risk-free procedure, especially when it comes to young children who must be anaesthetised and ventilated. The procedure itself could result in death.
Applying the Bolam test, although a minority of the experts said they would not have intubated P, their evidence was reasonable and logical and, therefore, had to be carefully considered. The fact the doctor did not attend to P did not cause his death, as had she seen him, she would not have intubated him. Given her decision in the hypothetical situation would have been supported by “a responsible body of medical professionals skilled in that particular profession”, the doctor was not liable despite “there is a body of opinion that [took] a contrary view”.
The recent case of CDE v Surrey and Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust [2023] EWCA Civ 1330) illustrates whether the legal test to be applied is Bolam or Bolitho. The Claimant was born by caesarean section, having suffered acute profound hypoxic ischemia before, during and following her birth. This left her suffering from quadriplegic Cerebral Palsy with severe global development delay.
The Claimant argued that negligent care, delay in her delivery resulting from not transferring her mother to the labour ward, as well as failing to monitor her heart rate during delivery, had caused or materially contributed to her condition.
At trial, the judge acknowledged that the Defendant had breached its duty by delaying getting the mother to the labour ward. Still, this delay made no difference to the actual outcome, and the actions of the Defendant saved the lives of the Claimant and her mother. Specifically, the trial judge found that the Claimant’s mother had arrived at the labour ward just before 17:50 and was then connected to the cardiotocograph (CTG) to monitor foetal heart rate. By 17:51, the transducer was sounding out the Claimant’s heartbeat, which was bradycardic. The consultant obstetrician had been on the labour ward and outside the mother’s room at 17.50, entering the room at 17.52, then examining the Claimant’s mother and immediately ordering a C-section.
Applying a ‘but for’ scenario, the trial judge concluded that the consultant would not have entered the mother’s room any earlier, regardless of the delay.
On appeal, the Claimant argued that the judge had incorrectly applied the Bolam test of what a responsible midwife would have done, rather than the test set out in Bolitho, namely what the consultant obstetrician would actually have done had it not been for the breach of duty (i.e. delaying getting the mother to the labour ward).
The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, made clear that when, in a clinical negligence claim, findings of factual causation are being made following a breach of duty by omission, the Court must assess what would probably have happened in the counter-factual world where the omission never occurred. It follows, therefore, when deciding on causation, following a breach of duty by omission, it is not appropriate to apply the Bolam test by enquiring whether the treatment actually given, or indeed the absence of treatment, was nevertheless justified based on a responsible body of relevant professional opinion.
CDE clarifies that the following steps must be taken when establishing factual causation in the case where an omission causes a breach of duty:
- Firstly, what probably would have happened in the counter-factual world (where no breach of duty occurred). If the answer to this question is that injury would probably have been avoided then causation will be established. Bolam is not relevant in this situation.
- Secondly, if the injury would probably have occurred in the counter-factual world, the question to be asked is “did the treatment given, or absence of treatment, meet the standard supported by a responsible body of relevant opinion”? This is the Bolam test. If there is a supportive, relevant body of opinion, then causation cannot be established.
Hunter v Hanley
Hunter v Hanley is the Scottish law equivalent of Bolam. Lord Clyde famously provided the following test for establishing clinical negligence:
“[i]n the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine difference of opinion.”
“one man clearly is not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that of other professional men.”
“The true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill and care would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care.”
Up until this point, the standard of care required by a healthcare professional in Scotland had not been firmly established. The above test was subsequently approved by the House of Lords and cited in Bolam.
Material contribution
For expert witnesses in clinical negligence cases, it is vital to understand what is meant by whether, once causation is established, the negligence materially contributed to the patient’s injury.
The case of CDE is an excellent example of how material contribution can become a significant issue in medical negligence cases, especially Cerebral Palsy, stroke, or other types of cases where the timing of medical intervention can significantly affect the level of injury sustained.
If material contribution is established in a case like CDE, the Claimant will undoubtedly argue they are entitled to claim in full for the Cerebral Palsy injury. However, this goes against logical thinking in cases where there is a delay of a minute or two. In most cases of this type, especially in birth injury matters, the Claimant will have something wrong with them before the negligence occurred, otherwise, there would be no need for medical intervention. This differs from personal injury cases, where the Claimant is generally healthy until the negligence happens. It can be challenging to separate the tortious and non-tortious causes of the injury.
In cases where material contribution is an issue, expert witnesses need to present evidence to the Court as to whether a) an injury can vary in grievousness and prognosis depending on particular facts and b) how and why the Defendant’s negligence materially contributed to the injury sustained.
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